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THE SUPREME DIGITAL DIVIDE 
 
Mary Graw Leary* 
 
“[B]ecause of the role that these devices have come to play in contemporary 
life, searching their contents implicates very sensitive privacy interests that 
this Court is poorly positioned to understand and evaluate.”1 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Society has long struggled with the meaning of privacy in a modern 
world.2  This struggle is not new.  With the advent of modern technology 
and information sharing, however, the challenges have become more 
complex.3  Socially, Americans seek to both protect their private lives, and 
 * Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.  Many thanks to 
Steve Young for his outstanding assistance; Katherine Olson and Tina Lee for their research; Arnold 
Loewy for his commitment to exploring critical Fourth Amendment issues; and the Texas Tech Law 
Review staff for their dedication and patience. 
 1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
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also to utilize technology to connect with the world.  Commercially, 
industries seek to obtain information from individuals, often without their 
consent, and sell it to the highest bidder.4  As technology has advanced, the 
ability of other individuals, institutions, and governments to encroach upon 
this privacy has strengthened.5  Nowhere is this tension between individual 
privacy rights and government security interests felt more acutely than 
within the context of the Fourth Amendment.6 
Notwithstanding the long duration of this struggle, jurisprudentially, 
the nation is at a critical point.  Traditionally, the touchstone for analyzing 
the boundaries of Fourth Amendment searches is reasonableness.7  Quite 
literally, therefore, the Supreme Court has the task of determining the 
unanswerable: What is reasonable?8  This task, combined with the modern 
realities of rapidly changing technology, increased use of government 
surveillance, and changing expectations and conceptions of privacy, as well 
as differing perspectives of privacy in a heterogeneous society, becomes an 
even further complicated endeavor.9 
One of the significant realities in play at this critical juncture lies 
within the Court itself.  This Article asserts that there is a new, different 
form of the digital divide—the divide between the perspective of the Court 
and twenty-first century realities—which has the potential to negatively 
impact Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.10  This Article focuses on two 
specific aspects of that gap, arguing that this gap in experience and 
perspective contributes to false presumptions by the Court, which then leads 
to less than optimal opinions.11  Such an approach creates a veritable house 
of cards in which the opinions themselves are weakened and erode over 
time.12  The potential of the Court to add crucial guidance in the area of 
privacy law in contemporary society is immense.13  That being said, any 
 4. See generally Mary Graw Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof – Saving the Fourth Amendment from 
Commercial Conditioning by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to Third Parties, 50 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 341, 343–44 (2013) [hereinafter Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof] (discussing entities that collect 
data online about individuals); Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: 
Commercial Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 331, 333 (2012) [hereinafter Leary, Missed Opportunity] (discussing commercial 
technologies that eliminate expectations of privacy). 
 5. See infra Parts II–III. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. E.g., Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1048 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011)); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part VI. 
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constructive impact is compromised when the validity of the opinions 
precludes their ability to withstand the test of time.14 
Parts II and III of this Article discuss the gap generally, with specific 
attention paid to the divide between the Court and technological realities, 
and the gap between the Court and the realities of modern policing and 
pressures on law enforcement.15  These sections specifically argue that 
these divides result in opinions purporting to determine what is reasonable 
in modern life, but which rest upon a set of inaccurate presumptions.16  Part 
IVwill illustrate this phenomenon by analyzing Riley v. California, in which 
the Court held that the police may not dispense with the warrant 
requirement to search arrestees’ cell phones incident to arrest.17  This 
section will examine three inaccurate presumptions made in Riley, arguing 
that they contribute to a failed jurisprudence in this critical area.18  Part 
Vwill discuss the significance of this approach by the Court.19  Finally, Part 
VI will explore ways to reform this approach in the future.20 
II.  THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN DEVELOPING FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”21  This clause, referred to as the “Reasonableness Clause” of 
the Fourth Amendment, requires the Court to determine which government 
searches are reasonable and which are not, thereby violating the Fourth 
Amendment.22  The Court’s history of developing a workable framework 
for this analysis is somewhat inconsistent.  While originally utilizing a 
trespass–property law framework, the Court moved from that approach in 
1965 in Katz v. United States, adopting a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” analysis.23  In so doing, the Court explicitly stated that property 
law was no longer the Court’s approach.24  More recently, however, the 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See infra Parts I–II. 
 16. See infra Parts I–II. 
 17. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014); infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part V.  
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 22. See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2442, 2451–53 (2015) (discussing the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement). 
 23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53, 361 (1967). 
 24. Id. As the Court noted in Katz, “The premise that property interests control the right of the 
Government to search and seize has been discredited.”  Id. at 353 (quoting Warden, Md. Peni. v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 183–84 
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Supreme Court reverted back to a property analysis in United States v. 
Jones, when it concluded that the Katz approach supplemented the trespass–
property framework, but did not replace it.25 
Notwithstanding this somewhat inconsistent and convoluted history,26 
the Court has not retreated from its repeated assertion that “the ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”27  This inquiry 
does not require a determination of what is reasonable to the Court;28 rather, 
the Katz inquiry defines the reasonable expectation of privacy test as a two-
pronged approach.29  The test (originally from Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence) demands, absent an exception to the warrant requirement, a 
search warrant if the government examines an area in which an individual 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.30  The reasonableness of this 
expectation is determined by establishing the following: (1) the individual 
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy in the location searched (the 
subjective prong); and (2) that expectation is one that society is prepared to 
accept as reasonable (the objective prong).31  As such, a fundamental role of 
the Court in determining the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is 
determining reasonableness. 
III.  THE JUDICIAL DIGITAL DIVIDE 
The term digital divide is one that traditionally refers to the divide 
between different segments of the population regarding access to 
technology and the Internet.  It references the divide between “information 
rich” and “information poor.”32  It has also been used to refer to the 
technological divide between affluent and more impoverished communities 
(1984).(applying the Katz test and the open fields doctrine to conclude that, although there was a 
trespass, there was no Fourth Amendment violation). 
 25. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012); id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 
964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 26. Id. at 959–60 (Alito, J., concurring) (disputing this revisionist history regarding Katz).  For a 
full discussion of the dubious mischaracterization of Katz by the Jones majority, see Leary, Missed 
Opportunity, supra note 4, at 342. 
 27. E.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014)); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1617 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 
 28. E.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing, as a 
longtime critic of the Katz test, that one of the problems with the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
is that judges tend to only assess what is reasonable to them). 
 29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 360.  
 32. E.g., Gerald Doppelt, Equality and the Digital Divide, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601, 
601 (2002). 
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“based on race, income, ethnicity, education, profession, and gender,”33 as 
well as the different uses and approaches to technology between digital 
natives and digital immigrants.34 
Another divide exists, however.  This divide, labeled here the “judicial 
digital divide,” is between the Court and the reality of modern life for both 
the public as well as for law enforcement.35  Such a divide is one with far 
reaching consequences, given the role of the Supreme Court in determining 
what is reasonable.36  This is particularly true within the context of 
technology because three phenomena occur simultaneously. 
Technology is playing an increasing role in the public’s life.  
Individuals are using technology in their vehicles, with their cell phones, 
through the Internet, even in their eyewear and watches.37  They do so to 
bank, date, and engage in other activities traditionally thought to be 
personal.38  In so doing, individuals, often unknowingly, create numerous 
pieces of information, thereby exposing themselves to infinite opportunities 
to be monitored and have information collected about them.39  An entire 
industry has developed around the collection of this data and its 
unauthorized use by third parties.40  The government is no different, and in 
certain situations, seeks to obtain this information in its law enforcement 
and anti-terrorism efforts.41  The use of technology is also manifested in law 
enforcement advancements themselves.42  Law enforcement increasingly 
uses technology to become more efficient, accurate, and effective.43  
Whether it is DNA collection, license plate readers, or video monitoring, 
 33. Id.; see also Amir Hatem Ali, Note, The Power of Social Media in Developing Nations: New 
Tools for Closing the Global Digital Divide and Beyond, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 188 (2011) 
(defining “digital divide” as describing unequal distribution of communication technology). 
 34. E.g., Kari Mercer Dalton, Bridging the Digital Divide and Guiding the Millennial Generation’s 
Research and Analysis, 18 BARRY L. REV. 167, 167 (2012); Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 MISS. L.J. 1035, 1039 (2011). 
 35. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 36. See cases cited supra note 27. 
 37. See Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy 
and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. no 2., 2015, at 1, 6, 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i2/article6.pdf; Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use 2015, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smarthphone-use-in-2015/ (documenting the 
effect smartphones have on all aspects of modern life). 
 38. See Susannah Fox, 51% of U.S. Adults Bank Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/07/51-of-u-s-adults-bank-online/; Amanda Lenhart, Dating & 
Mating in the Digital Age, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 26, 2014), www.pewinternet.org/2014/04/26/dating-
mating-in-the-digital-age.  
 39. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1092–95 (2002). 
 40. Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof, supra note 4. 
 41. See Solove, supra note 39, at 1106. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See, e.g., infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text. 
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the government seeks to advance its mission through use of technology.44  
Finally, technology affords criminals new avenues to victimize people.45  
Whether it be through exploitation, identity theft, financial crimes, or 
otherwise, criminals use technological tools to victimize others.46  As such, 
law enforcement is expected to engage on this additional battlefield in its 
efforts to prevent and respond to crime.47 
Thus, the opportunity for government evidence collection through 
technology is growing exponentially, and any divide between the Court and 
reality regarding technology potentially has significant implications.48  This 
divide manifests itself most clearly in two aspects:  (1) in the chasm 
between the Court’s understanding of technology and how it is used by 
people in everyday life; and (2) the chasm also exists between the Court and 
the realities of modern policing.49 
A.  The Ivory Tower Concept Is Not Novel 
The Court has long suffered the critique that it functions in an “ivory 
tower” far separated from the experience of everyday Americans.50  This 
reality has been observed in many different contexts.51 
Significant scholarship has addressed these criticisms in the arena of 
race and police interaction with minority communities.52  Professor Donna 
Coker insightfully commented that “[i]n the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, ‘there is a tendency . . . to pretend that the world we all know 
is not the world in which law enforcement operates.’”53  Others have 
commented upon the individual Justices’ lack of experiences common to 
most people.54  For example, much was made about the implication by 
Justice Roberts that he has never been subjected to a police traffic stop.55  
Similarly, the Court has been criticized for its statement that donating large 
sums of money to candidates is unrelated to corruption and for failing to 
 44. See, e.g., infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text. 
 45. See, e.g., infra notes 79–114 and accompanying text. 
 46. See, e.g., infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. 
 47. See, e.g., infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. 
 48. See discussion infra Part III.A–B. 
 49. See discussion infra Part III.A–B. 
 50. See infra note 56. 
 51. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 52. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 53. Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice 
System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 827 (2003) (quoting Stephen A Saltzburg, The Supreme 
Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 133 (2003)). 
 54. See, e.g., infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 55. Cristian Farias, The Chief Justice Has Never Been Pulled Over in His Life, SLATE (Feb. 
11, 2015, 9:36 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/02/chief 
_justice_john_ roberts_has_never_been_pulled_over_rodriguez_v_united.html. 
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understand that it is impossible for a victim of sexual discrimination to file 
a complaint of discrimination until she is actually made aware of a salary 
disparity between herself and her male co-workers.56  These critiques share 
a common theme: a gap between the experiences of the members of the 
Court and the experiences of the public.57  This gap seems to affect the 
decisions of the Court, which has the potential to cause harm when the 
Court is trying to determine what is reasonable to the common person. 
B.  The Divide Is Magnified When It Relates to Technology 
When it comes to technology, the gap is even more significant.58  
Some better known examples of the disconnect between the Court and the 
everyday use of technology in America illustrate this point.59  For example, 
Justice Kagan’s remarks have been interpreted as stating that the Court is 
“basically clueless when it comes to technology,” conceding the Justices 
were not well versed in email—in 2013.60  Chief Justice Roberts rather 
famously asked during oral argument what the difference was between a 
pager and email.61  In Riley, Justice Roberts illustrated the disconnect 
between his experience and that of many Americans by aggressively 
challenging an advocate’s representation that many people not engaged in 
criminal activity have more than one cell phone on their person.62  The 
Court further displayed an equal ignorance in Quon when it asked about 
what would happen when two texts were sent at the same time.63 
Unfortunately, the media has covered these events with an almost 
quaint tone.  They are humorously presented as though they were vignettes 
from one’s cousin in a foreign country unfamiliar with local customs.64  
However, there is little humorous about a lack of understanding of everyday 
life in America by the body charged with determining what a reasonable 
American expects or a reasonable officer does. 
 56. Mougambi Jouet, Is the Supreme Court Disconnected from the Real World?, THE HILL (Apr. 
22, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/203982-is-the-supreme-court-
disconnected-from-the-real-world (discussing critiques of the Supreme Court for its reasoning in both 
Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)). 
 57. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 58. See, e.g., infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 59. See, e.g., infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 60. E.g., Will Oremus, Elena Kagan Admits Supreme Court Justices Haven’t Quite Figured Out 
Email Yet, SLATE (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/08/20/elena_kagan_ 
supreme_court_justices_haven_t_gotten_to_email_use_paper_memos.html. 
 61. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-
1332). 
 62. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (2014) (No. 13-212). 
 63. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 61, at 44. 
 64. See, e.g., Oremus, supra note 60. 
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This judicial digital divide, raises some serious questions regarding an 
institution whose average age of retirement is 78.7 years and whose average 
age of membership is nearly 70 years old, and the Court’s ability to 
measure the reasonableness expected in modern, everyday life.65  This is 
not to say that people over any certain age are unable to understand 
technological changes.66  That is certainly not the case or the basis for this 
Article’s argument. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion and 
Justice Alito’s opinion concurring in judgment in Jones both reflect insight 
into the changing technological landscape.67  Justice Alito calls for a 
legislative response to questions regarding digital surveillance, arguing that 
the legislature is indeed better equipped to measure societal expectations.68  
For her part, Justice Sotomayor has expressed a willingness to revisit basic 
Fourth Amendment doctrines, such as the third-party doctrine, in light of 
their unworkability in a modern technological age.69 
Notwithstanding these periodic insights, there is a tension between a 
Court that experiences a different reality than most of society, combined 
with its intentional, slow movement deciding issues regarding a rapidly 
changing aspect of life.70  In addition to technology-induced changes, there 
can be no doubt that society’s expectations of privacy are changing rapidly 
and becoming more complex. The Pew Research Center reports that “the 
majority of adults . . . feel that their privacy is being challenged along such 
core dimensions as the security of their personal information and their 
ability to retain confidentiality.”71  The fluidity of these perceptions is 
problematic as the Court attempts to discern the public’s privacy 
 65. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Justice for Life?  The Case for Supreme Court Term 
Limits, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20050414061240/http://www. 
opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110006539; Lawrence Hurley, In U.S., When High Tech 
Meets High Court, High Jinks Ensue, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-
in-us-when-high-tech-meets-high-court-high-jinks-ensue-2014-09 (calculating the average age of 
Supreme Court Justices at just over 68).  
 66. See supra Part III. 
 67. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 69. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 70. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (“The Court must proceed with care 
when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic 
equipment . . . . The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications 
of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”). 
 71. MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE POST 
SNOWDEN ERA 2 (2014), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf. 
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expectations.72  As the public’s expectation shifts, so too must the Court’s 
reflection of it.73 
The issue of privacy is critical to contemporary life.74  It is also an 
evolving and complex issue due to the role technology plays in daily life, 
perpetrating crime, and government surveillance.75  Within this complicated 
landscape, the Court is charged with determining what is reasonable.  
However, the judicial digital divide is problematic in this regard.76  It 
results in the Court making inaccurate presumptions and resting opinions on 
them.77  This is detrimental not only because the opinions are not strong, 
but also because it creates an untenable legal situation.78  This is an area in 
the law in need of solid jurisprudence.79  When the Court’s opinions are 
flawed due to false presumptions, the entire system suffers.80  Thus, the 
judicial digital divide undermines the value of the Court’s opinions, as well 
as its ability to offer clarity to individuals and law enforcement.81  An 
example of this phenomenon is the Court’s analysis in Riley v. California.82 
IV.  RILEY V. CALIFORNIA 
A.  The Opinion 
The judicial digital divide is very clearly demonstrated in Riley v. 
California, which held that the search incident to arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement did not apply to cell phones, and police must generally 
obtain a warrant before conducting a search.83  The opinion itself involved 
two cases in which the police performed some form of a search on an 
arrestee’s cell phone.84  In Riley, the police searched the arrestee’s 
smartphone incident to his arrest and later at the police station, observing 
information related to gang activity.85  The government used that 
information against Riley for charges related to a gang shooting.86  In the 
 72. See supra Part II. 
 73. See supra Part II. 
 74. See supra note 71. 
 75. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 76. See supra Part III. 
 77. See supra Part II. 
 78. See supra Part I. 
 79. See supra Part I. 
 80. See supra Part I. 
 81. See supra Part I. 
 82. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (discussing the reasonableness of a 
warrantless search of the defendant’s cell phone during a search incident to arrest). 
 83. See id. at 2485.  While the majority opinion discussed several aspects of Riley, this Article will 
briefly summarize its framework. 
 84. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–82. 
 85. Id. at 2480. 
 86. Id. at 2481. 
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companion case, United States v. Wurie, police examined incoming calls 
and the phone log of a “flip” cell phone which helped them determine the 
arrestee’s address and locate narcotics stored there.87 
The Court acknowledged some of the basic characteristics of the 
modern cell phone, noting that modern-day cell phones are different than 
other types of items that may be seized from an arrestee.88  The Court paid 
specific attention to the ability of a cell phone to store vast quantities of 
information.89  But it further recognized it is not just the amount of 
information that can be accessed, but the type of information, which 
includes financial records, records of purchases, internet searches, and GPS 
information, that makes cell phones unique.90 
The Court began its analysis by noting that the search incident to arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement rests on two justifications: officer 
safety and concerns about the destruction of evidence.91  The Court found 
that the data on the phone was not a danger to police and, therefore, did not 
justify a search of the phone without a warrant.92  The Riley Court further 
held that concerns regarding evidence destruction raised by the prosecution, 
namely encryption and data wiping, were not persuasive because such 
action would be effectuated by third parties or the ordinary functioning of 
the phone.93  Therefore, the Court reasoned that such occurrences were not 
implicated by Chimel’s concern that an arrestee himself will destroy 
evidence due to arrest.94  A main concern was that the data, either alone or 
in combination with other pieces of information, has the potential to reveal 
highly personal information.95  Furthermore, the data is not analogous to the 
type of information an individual would traditionally have on his person 
when arrested or even in his home.96  Thus, the Court concluded that both 
the quantity and quality of data on a cell phone distinguished the cell phone 
from other items found on an arrested person.97   The Court recognized the 
growing reality that viewing cell phones as containers similar to other 
containers on an arrestee is problematic due to society’s evolving uses of 
cell phones.98 
 87. Id. at 2481–82. 
 88. Id. at 2488–90. 
 89. Id. at 2489. 
 90. Id. at 2490. 
 91. Id. at 2485 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2486–87. 
 94. Id. at 2486–88. 
 95. Id. at 2490. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 2490–91. 
 98. Id. 
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Moreover, cell phone technology continues to evolve.  Increasingly, 
cell phones are not saving data on the devices themselves, but instead act 
as portals to information stored remotely.99  Although the Government 
conceded that searches incident to arrest could not access information on 
the cloud, the Court rejected the Government-suggested solution of 
implementing protocols for such searches.100  As the Court put it rather 
bluntly, “[t]he Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to 
government agency protocols.”101 
B.  Presumptions 
The purpose of this Article is not necessarily to critique Riley’s 
ultimate holding that the police must obtain a warrant prior to examining a 
cell phone found on an arrestee.  Given the distinction between cell phones 
and other devices often possessed by individuals at the time of arrest, this 
holding is with merit.  It is a legitimate conclusion that the privacy interests 
of an individual in his cell phone outweigh the government’s interest in 
searching the phone.  The focus of this Article is to analyze the framework 
and approach of the Court in Riley. 
The specific concerns examined here are the presumptions the Riley 
Court made in its discussion, which formed the basis for its decision.  The 
Court’s presumptions focused upon in this Article all have to do with 
technology or law enforcement, and are arguably flawed.  When the Court’s 
jurisprudence in such an important area is flawed, it undermines the law.  
As the Court mentioned in Riley, it has a “general preference to provide 
clear guidance.”102  Guidance cannot be clear if the basis for that guidance 
is compromised due to a lack of an appreciation of certain realities. 
The following is a discussion of three presumptions in the Riley 
opinion that are arguably flawed.  This Article submits that this pattern of 
presumptions can compromise the positive impact the Court can have on 
the difficult questions presented by modern-day privacy expectations.103 
1.  Presumption 1: The Threat of Remote Wiping Is Invalid 
Remote wiping, also known as a mobile kill switch, is the ability of a 
person to remotely remove data, apps, or even the operating system from a 
 99. See id. at 2491. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See supra Part V. 
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cell phone.104  Riley discussed the Government’s main argument that the 
possibility of a seized cell phone being remotely wiped created a true threat 
of evidence destruction.105  The Court rejected this argument, stating that 
“once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no 
longer any risk that the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating 
data from the phone.”106  Embedded within this presumption are two faulty 
grounds.  First, it limits the Court’s concern to situations in which the 
arrestee himself could remotely wipe the phone.107  Second, the 
presumption erroneously concludes that there is “no risk” that the phone 
will be wiped.108 
The first point, that the Court should only be concerned with whether 
the arrestee himself can remotely wipe the phone, is not based on reality.  
The Riley Court correctly notes that the Chimel decision itself was 
concerned with the actions of an arrestee. 109  However, the Court has since 
broadenedthat approach.  Riley’s deviation from that path and its failure to 
recognize both  the realities of cell phone use and the interconnectedness of 
people generally, benefits criminals. 
In Maryland v. Buie, the search incident to arrest standard was 
modified to respond to a situation in which an individual is arrested within a 
home.110  Recognizing that arrests can be dangerous situations, the Court 
affirmed the police’s ability to search for people in closets or other 
adjoining spaces from which an attack could be launched.111  Although this 
expansion was based on officer safety, not on evidence destruction, it 
demonstrates that the Court is not only concerned with the actions of an 
arrestee, but also with the potential actions of others. 
This reasoning is worth considering in today’s interconnected world.  
People are more connected with one another than ever—often remaining in 
constant contact via their devices.112  It is also well documented that 
offenders utilize cell phones and other technologies to remain in contact 
 104. Definition of Remote Wipe, PC MAG, http://pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/66274/remote-wipe 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2015). 
 105. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486. 
 106. Id. (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 2485–88 (majority opinion) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763–64 (1969)). 
 110. See Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (1990). 
 111. Id. at 1098–99. 
 112. See AARON SMITH, PEW RES. CTR., AMERICANS AND TEXT MESSAGING 3 (2011), 
http://pewinternet.org/files/old-media/files/Reports/2011/Americans%20and%Text%20Messaging.pdf 
(finding that 83% of Americans own cell phones, 73% of cell phone owners text, and young adults 
receive an average of 109.5 texts per day); Global Digital Communication: Texting, Social Networking 
Popular Worldwide, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/12/20/global-
digital-communication-texting-social-networking-popular-worldwide (“[I]n 19 out of 21 countries, a 
majority of mobile phone owners regularly send text messages.”). 
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with each other.113  Furthermore, in certain types of cases, such as domestic 
violence, prostitution, and human trafficking, offenders may use cell phones 
to remain in contact with their victims.114  In either scenario, when an 
offender is arrested, there may be information on the offender’s cell phone 
that the offender or others want to remain undiscovered by police.  While 
the search incident to arrest exception is aimed at the desperate arrestee who 
may hide or destroy evidence within his reach due to the arrest, given the 
interconnectedness of people, criminal actors, and victims, it is misplaced to 
not acknowledge that a desperate cohort may take the same action, triggered 
by the same event: the arrest. 
More concerning, however, is the Riley Court’s statement that remote 
wipes are not “prevalent.”115  Even at the time of the opinion’s drafting, this 
issue was well documented in the lower courts and in mainstream media.116  
While there were differing opinions among the lower courts on the 
relevance of the ability to remotely wipe, some courts did justify cell phone 
searches because of this capability.117  Similarly, in 2012, mainstream 
media documented that “[a]ll of the major smartphone platforms have some 
kind of remote erase capability.”118  Various media sources list the types of 
 113. See United States v. Lazcano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 842–844 (10th Cir. 1999); People v. 
Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 890–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); EOGHAN CASEY & BENJAMIN TURNBULL, 
DIGITAL EVIDENCE ON MOBILE DEVICES, in EOGHAN CASEY, DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER 
CRIME ch. 20 (3d ed. 2011), www.booksite.elsevier.com/9780123742681/Chapter_20_Final.pdf; David 
Décary-Hétu & Carlo Morselli, Gang Presence in Social Network Sites, 5 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 
876, 878–80 (2011). 
 114. MARK LATONERO, THE RISE OF MOBILE AND THE DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED 
TRAFFICKING 10 (2012), http://technologyandtrafficking.usc.edu/files/2012/11/USC-Annenberg-
Technology-and-Human-Trafficking-2012.pdf; Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used to Stalk, Control 
Domestic Abuse Victims, NPR (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:22 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/15/346149979/smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-
control-domestic-abuse-victims. 
 115. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014). 
 116. See Mat Honan, Break Out a Hammer: You’ll Never Believe the Data ‘Wiped’ Smartphones 
Store, WIRED (Apr. 1, 2013), www.wired.com/2013/04/smartphone-data-trail; Bob Segall, Cell Phone 
Warning: Deleted Personal Information Often Left Behind, WTHR.COM (Mar. 11, 2013, 3:18 PM), 
www.wthr.com/story/21419450/cell-phone-warning-deleted-information-often-left-behind. 
 117. E.g., United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 
2008) (concluding that a search of a cell phone’s address book and call history was reasonable because, 
among other reasons, testimony from law enforcement indicated that the cellular provider enabled 
customers to remotely delete all of the information located on the cell phone); United States v. Young, 
No. 5:05CR63-01-02, 2006 WL 1302667, at *13 (N.D. W. Va., May 9, 2006) (holding that exigent 
circumstances justified searching a cell phone for text messages when the cell phone had an option for 
auto deleting messages after one day). 
 118. Jamie Lendino, How to Remotely Disable Your Lost or Stolen Phone, PCMAG.COM (Apr. 12, 
2012), www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2352755,00.asp; see also Smartphone Remote Wiping Feature 
Thwarts Secret Service, Law Enforcement, HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS WIRE (May 19, 2010), 
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/smartphone-remote-wiping-feature-thwarts-secret-service-
law-enforcement (“Smartphones such as Blackberry and iPhone offer a remote-wipe feature: if your 
phone is lost or stolen, you can remotely erase all the data stored on the phone; this feature protects 
one’s privacy, but it also allow the accomplices of criminals and terrorists captured by law enforcement 
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phones with remote wiping capability, including all major phones such as 
iPhone, Android, Blackberry, and Microsoft.119  Not only do the phones 
have this capability, but mainstream media and manufacturers also 
documented step-by-step instructions on how to wipe the devices, 
estimating that the time required to do so is approximately five minutes.120  
Therefore, at the time of the Riley opinion, the Court’s notion, that the 
capability to remotely wipe a cell phone was not prevalent, was misplaced. 
That presumption is even more incorrect today.  In recent years the 
extent of government surveillance has captured the attention of the 
media.121  In the wake of revelations by Edward Snowden of the 
government’s massive data collection efforts, specifically the collection of 
data from phone calls, the public’s concern regarding access to data has 
increased.122  Moreover, with the rise of smartphones came a rise in the 
theft of these valuable devices.123  As such, there is an increased consumer 
demand for the ability to wipe the data from one’s phone.124  Phone 
manufacturers responded by advertising and marketing this feature.125  Not 
surprisingly, reports of smartphones being remotely wiped while in police 
custody followed.126  Therefore, the notion that this capability is not 
prevalent or even a valid issue is misplaced. 
The Court in Riley suggests that one reason remote wiping is not a 
problem is because of law enforcement’s ability to protect cell phones from 
remote wiping by the use of a Faraday bag or another similar product that 
remotely to erase all incriminating and intelligence-relevant data from the suspect’s phone before the 
police can access it.”). 
 119. See Lendino, supra note 118; Perform a Remote Wipe on a Mobile Phone, MICROSOFT 
TECHNET, https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/Aa998614(v=EXCHG.150).aspx (last modified 
Feb. 6, 2013). 
 120. See, e.g., Jerry Hildenbrand, Hands-on With the Android Device Manager Remote Wipe 
Feature, ANDROIDCENTRAL (Aug. 7, 2013, 4:12 PM), www.androidcentral.com/hands-android-device-
manager-remote-wipe-feature; Lendino, supra note 118; iCloud: Erase Your Device, APPLE, 
https://support.apple. com/kb/PH2701?locale=en_US (last modified Aug. 26, 2015). 
 121. See Bruce Schneier, What’s Next in Government Surveillance, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2015), 
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/whats-next-in-government-surveillance/385667/. 
 122. MADDEN, supra note 71. 
 123. See, e.g., Dana Hedgpeth, iPhone ‘Snatch and Grab’ Thefts on Metro Rise, WASH. POST (Mar. 
25, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/WP/2014/03/25/thefts-of-electronic-devices-on-
metro-rise.  
 124. See Donna Tapellini, Smart Phone Thefts Rose to 3.1 Million in 2013, CONSUMER REPS. (May 
28, 2014, 4:00 PM), www.consumerreports.com/org/cro/news/2014/04/smart-phone-thefts-rose-to-3-1-
million-last-year.htm. 
 125. See sources cited supra note 120. 
 126. See Brief for Respondent at 9–10, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-132) 
(documenting cases of phones being wiped after arrest); Zack Whittaker, Smartphones ‘Remotely 
Wiped’ in Police Custody, as Encryption vs. Law Enforcement Heats Up, ZDNET.COM (Oct. 9, 2014), 
www.zdnet.com/article/smartphones-remotely-wiped-in-police-custody-as-encryption-vs-law-
enforcement-heats-up. 
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can prevent the cell phone from receiving a signal.127  While the Court is 
correct that Faraday bags provide a technological advantage, the Court’s 
overreliance on the existence of such technologies to dismiss legitimate 
concerns reflects a gap between the Court’s experience and the realities 
facing law enforcement.128 
A Faraday bag or cage is a container in which law enforcement can 
place a cell phone after seizing to prevent it from receiving a signal from a 
phone network or Bluetooth.129  These bags are designed to prevent remote 
access.130  They are manufactured by several companies and marketed to 
law enforcement to combat cybercrime and retain evidence.131  They vary in 
size, quality, and capability.132 
After presuming that remote wiping was not prevalent, the Court in 
Riley went on to assert that, even if it were, the police could overcome it by 
simply either disconnecting the cell phone or using a Faraday bag, which it 
referred to as a “cheap” and “easy” solution.133  The many sub-assumptions 
in this analysis underscore the gap between the pressures on today’s law 
enforcement and the Court’s perception of their capabilities.134 
The Court’s suggestion that law enforcement disconnect the cell phone 
ignores the obligations on law enforcement to avoid compromising the 
integrity of the evidence.135  Disconnecting or turning off the cell phone 
may indeed alter it in ways that compromise its integrity.136 
More importantly, the Court’s characterization of the Faraday bag as a 
foolproof solution is misplaced.  While certainly a positive technological 
development, the Court’s reliance on Faraday bags as a flawless solution 
and dismissal of criticism is of concern.137  While some Faraday bags are 
large and allow police to work on and manipulate the cell phone while it 
remains inside the bag or box by using a clear window, others are not.138 
 127. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2487 (2014). 
 128. See supra notes 115–127 and accompanying text. 
 129. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Department of 
Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, “Awareness Brief: Find My iPhone”); 
United States v. Lustig, 3 F. Supp. 3d 808, 815 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
 130. See Lustig, 3 F. Supp. 3d at 815. 
 131. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487. 
 132. See, e.g., Faraday Pouches and Bags, ARROWHEAD FORENSICS, www.crime-scene.com/store/ 
faraday.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2015) (selling Faraday containers from $21.00 to $250.00); Faraday 
Bags, EDEC, https://www.edecdf.com/product-category/faraday-bags/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2015). 
 133. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487. 
 134. See id. at 2486–89. 
 135. See id. at 2487. 
 136. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012); RICK AYERS ET 
AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES ON MOBILE DEVICE 
FORENSICS (DRAFT) 30 (2013), http://www.nist.gov/forensics/research/upload/draft-guidelines-on-
mobile-device-forensics.pdf. 
 137. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487. 
 138. See sources cited supra note 132. 
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Generally, a Faraday bag is only useful so long as a cell phone is within 
it.139  A targeted remote wipe by an offender’s ally, who could be constantly 
searching for the phone’s signal to take advantage of its briefest removal 
from the bag, is possible.  Even if the cell phone is inside of a Faraday bag, 
the risk of improperly sealing the container is real and could lead to cell 
phone access to a cell network.140  Additionally, “Faraday containers . . . 
[do] not necessarily eliminate [radio signals] completely, allowing the 
possibility of communications being established with a cell tower, if in its 
immediate vicinity.”141 
The Court did not consider further information, which undermines its 
conclusions that the arrestee himself is not a threat and that Faraday bags 
resolve any real threat of remote wiping.142  Some wiping of data occurs 
internally.143  For instance, a person may alter the data on their phone 
through a so-called logic bomb.144  A logic bomb is an alteration that is 
internally set up on a cell phone to activate if certain conditions are not 
met.145  For example, a logic bomb may require the entry of a certain 
sequence of numbers into a cell phone at specific time intervals.146  If that 
condition does not occur, the cell phone will destroy its own internal 
data.147  Some cell phones are configured with “geo-fencing” that will 
automatically wipe the data when the phone leaves a certain geographic 
area.148  A Faraday bag may not prevent the use of this technique, which the 
arrestee himself would cause.149  Additionally, Faraday bags do nothing to 
prevent preprogrammed deletions such as those associated with Snapchat 
and TigerText.150  Furthermore, when a cell phone is in a Faraday bag, its 
battery life decreases because it is constantly searching for a network.151  
Continued failure to connect to a network “may cause certain mobile 
 139. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487. 
 140. AYERS ET AL., supra note 136. 
 141. Id.; ERIC KATZ, A FIELD TEST OF MOBILE SHIELD DEVICES 1–2 (2010), 
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/techmasters/33/. 
 142. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2487. 
 143. See Eamon P. Doherty, The Need for a Faraday Bag, DFI NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014, 9:44 AM), 
www.forensicmag.com/articles/2014/02/need-faraday-bag. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. AYERS ET AL., supra note 136, at 31. 
 149. Id. at 30–31. 
 150. Adam M. Gershowitz, Seizing a Cell Phone Incident to Arrest: Data Extraction Devices, 
Faraday Bags, or Aluminum Foil as a Solution to the Warrantless Cell Phone Search Problem, 22 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 601, 608 (2013); Sean Gallagher, Update: Boeing’s Black—This Android Phone 
Will Self-Destruct, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 26, 2014, 3:01 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2014/02/boeings-black-this-android-phone-will-self-destruct/. 
 151. AYERS ET AL., supra note 136. 
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devices to reset or clear network data that otherwise would be useful if 
recovered.”152 
Moreover, the Court’s presumption that Faraday bags are “cheap” is 
not as simple as it may seem.153  Such a label turns on quality.154  While it is 
true that some Faraday bags cost a few dollars on the Internet, some exceed 
$500.00.155  The cost of professional Faraday bags aimed at law 
enforcement markets can range from approximately $58.00 to hundreds of 
dollars.156  Concluding that Faraday bags are a viable solution for modern 
law enforcement presupposes a number of facts. 
First, the Court assumes adequate funding exists to equip police 
officers to carry such bags on their person and immediately place a 
recovered cell phone into the bag upon arrest.  Although it is recommended 
that law enforcement use such devices, the presumption that every police 
department can do so may be overly optimistic.157  Most police departments 
are small and underfunded, not large, well-funded operations with the 
money to purchase Faraday bags for the 13.5 million arrests that take place 
annually in the United States.158  Furthermore, most of those arrests take 
place in small police departments.159 
Notwithstanding the image of police departments projected by the 
media, approximately one-half (49%) of local law enforcement agencies 
employ less than ten officers, 24% employ less than five officers, and 4.9% 
have just one officer.160  While the correlation is not perfect, it would stand 
to reason that small police departments perform several million arrests 
annually.  Although some small police departments encourage the use of 
Faraday bags, it is not likely that all small departments receive funding for 
enough Faraday bags of the requisite quality, and it is even less likely that 
these departments have a forensic department to examine the device.161  
 152. Id. 
 153. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2487 (2014). 
 154. See Black Hole Data Bag, EDEC, https://www.edecdf.com/promo/vector-bags/index.php (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2015). 
 155. Id.; Faraday Pouches and Bags, supra note 134. 
 156. Faraday Pouches and Bags, supra note 134; Black Hole Data Bag, supra note 154. 
 157. AYERS ET AL., supra note 136.   
 158. Crime in the United States, 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/ 
data/table_29.html (last updated Sept. 2010). 
 159. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 160. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LOCAL POLICE DEP’TS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, 
AND PRACTICES 2 (May 2015), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf.  Fifty-seven percent of 
sheriffs’ offices employ less than twenty-five sworn personnel, and twenty-five percent employ less than 
ten deputies. ANDREA M. BURCH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SHERIFFS’ OFFICES, 2007 - STATISTICAL TABLES 
2 (Dec. 2012), www.bjs.gov/index/cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4555. 
 161. See Lucian McCarty, Forensic Frenzy: Higher Demand Being Placed on State Crime Labs, 
SARATOGIAN (May 11, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.saratogian.com/general-news/20130511/forensic-
frenzy-higher-demand-being-placed-on-state-crime-labs. If history is any lesson, police departments of 
all sizes struggle to keep up with the technical demands placed upon them.  See id. For example, 
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Many police departments have to apply for federal funding to obtain 
equipment such as bulletproof vests.162  The ability to buy Faraday bags and 
cages would likely be less of a priority.163  Some rural departments report 
that this requirement will strain their budgets, and instead are trying to 
improvise with microwaves.164  While the Riley Court indicated the use of 
aluminum foil as a viable replacement for Faraday bags, this too presents 
some challenges.165 
There is little doubt that Faraday bags are a technological 
advancement.  Compelling cases have been made that their use by law 
enforcement can provide a way in which cell phones can be preserved prior 
to obtaining a warrant.166  This Article’s concern is more on the Court’s 
overreliance on these bags to dismiss any concerns and to draw sweeping 
conclusions. 
The Court’s presumption differs significantly from reality.  This is not 
to say that Faraday bags are irrelevant.  They certainly are an advantage for 
law enforcement and an important method to preserve evidence.  It is the 
Court’s overreliance on them to dismiss valid concerns that is troubling.  
This presumption that remote wiping is not a threat, or that Faraday bags 
forensic examinations of computers take time and examiners.  Id.  The nation experienced a significant 
backlog in keeping up with them, and even the FBI experienced a significant backlog in processing its 
forensic evidence.  See OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION’S EFFORTS TO COMBAT CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN 29 (2009), 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0908/final.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., CRIMES AGAINST 
CHILDREN] (finding hundreds of digital evidence cases waiting for processing and a nine month delay); 
OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
LABORATORY’S FORENSIC DNA CASE BACKLOG  I (2012), 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2012/a1239.pdf (indicating a total of 403 backlogged forensic DNA 
cases).  This is due to several obstacles, many of which have to do with funding.  Even when local or 
more rural departments can benefit from a state-wide lab, the backlog can be lengthy due to cost.  See, 
e.g., McCarty, supra. The same is true for the examination of rape kits, with an estimated 400,000 of 
them never examined.  Nora Caplan-Bricker, The Backlog of 400,000 Unprocessed Rape Kits Is a 
Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116945/rape-kits-
backlog-joe-biden-announces-35-million-reopen-cases.  While many local police departments rely on 
federal supplemental funding, that has also been the subject of budget cuts.  See generally NAT’L 
CRIMINAL JUST. ASS’N & VERA INST. OF JUST., THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL BUDGET CUTS ON STATE AND 
LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY (2012), http://www.ncja.org/sites/default/files/documents/NCJA-VERA-
Summar-of-Sequestration-Survey-2012.pdf (indicating decreased federal funding to criminal justice 
stakeholder organizations). 
 162. See Paige Kelton, JSO Was Denied Federal Grant to Buy Bulletproof Vests, ACTIONNEWSJAX 
(Dec. 8, 2014, 10:15 PM) (noting that even larger police departments do not receive funds for vests). 
 163. See id. 
 164. See George Graham, Greenfield Police Turn to Microwave Ovens as Improvised Faraday 
Cages as Department Adjusts to U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Requiring Warrants for Cell Phone 
Searches, MASSLIVE (July 11, 2014, 3:09 PM), 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/07/greenfield_ police_turn_to_micr.html. 
 165. See KATZ, supra note 141, at 32 (discussing shielding issues); Gershowitz, supra note 150, at 
609 (arguing foil is a viable alternative). 
 166. Gershowitz, supra note 150. 
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resolve all the issues, reflects a lack of understanding of the technical uses 
of cell phones, as well as the real demands of modern policing. 
2.  Presumption 2: The Threat of Encryption Is Not a Significant Threat to 
Evidence Preservation 
Distinct from remote wiping, encryption is a method of making data 
unreadable by others.167  Many forms of encryption exist, but the Riley 
Court used it to describe situations beyond password protection when a 
phone locks and its “data becomes protected by sophisticated encryption 
that renders a phone all but ‘unbreakable’ unless police know the 
password.”168  The Riley Court did note that the arguments regarding 
encryption were not made in the lower courts, but went on to indicate that 
encryption was not a significant problem due to two factors.169  First, the 
Court again assumed it was not a prevalent practice; it recognized that the 
capability could be found only on “some modern” cell phones.170  Second, 
it concluded that the problem can be “fully prevented” by a Faraday bag or 
disabling the feature before it locks the device.171  The Court again asserted 
that data encryption is not an action of the arrestee, but the “ordinary 
operation of a phone’s security features” and, therefore, is not relevant to 
the search incident to arrest scenario.172 
As with remote wiping, this concern about active evidence destruction 
is misplaced, as is the Court’s narrow focus only on spontaneous (as 
opposed to pre-planned) active efforts to destroy evidence.173  United States 
v. Robinson made clear that the search incident to arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement needed no further justification.174  Police need not 
believe that the arrestee is actively destroying evidence to conduct a search 
incident to arrest.175  It is only the risk that destruction could occur that 
allows police to search.  Therefore, the fact that police do not see arrestees 
actively destroying the evidence on their phones upon arrest seems less 
critical than the Court suggests in Riley.176 
 167. United States v. Lustig, 3 F. Supp. 3d. 808, 816 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
 168. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 
11.). 
 169. Id. at 2486–87. 
 170. Id. at 2486. 
 171. Id. at 2486–87. 
 172. Id. at 2486.  
 173. See id. at 2486–87. 
 174. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 175. See id. at 228–29. 
 176. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486. 
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More troubling is the Court’s suggestion that encryption is only 
available on a few phones.177 This presumption is simply incorrect because 
virtually all major cell phone models have, or will have, this capability.  
“Content encryption capabilities are offered as a standard feature in many 
mobile devices or may be available through add-on applications.”178  This 
was the case for most cell phones for several years.179  For example, 
Android phones have had this feature since 2011.180 Apple’s products have 
been capable of encryption since 2009.181  What has changed between 2011 
and the present day is twofold.  First, encryption features are now a default 
setting and the capability to wipe cell phones comes standard.182  Second, in 
the past, law enforcement could access cell phone data under certain 
circumstances.183  It could do so through a so-called back door.184  This is 
no longer the case.185  Moreover, even at the time of Riley’s announcement, 
numerous Internet sites and media outlets offered “simple” instructions on 
how to encrypt data on one’s cell phone.186 
Not only were the Court’s presumptions inaccurate in 2014, the year 
Riley was announced, they are certainly no more true today.  In 2015, the 
Washington Post accurately described the state of the field as follows: 
Both [Apple and Google] have now embraced a form of encryption that in 
most cases will make it impossible for law enforcement officials to collect 
evidence from smartphones — even when authorities get legally binding 
warrants.187 
This was not an overstatement because all major cell phone companies 
provide phones with the ability to encrypt data with no back door way that 
allows access to law enforcement.188 
In September 2014, Apple announced that its phones and other 
products would feature such a high level of encryption that Apple itself will 
“lack the technical ability to unlock the phones or recover data for 
 177. See id.  
 178. AYERS ET AL., supra note 138, at 24. 
 179. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 180. Craig Timberg, Newest Androids Will Join iPhones in Offering Default Encryption, Blocking 
Police, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/18 
/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-police/. 
 181. AYERS ET AL., supra note 136, at 43. 
 182. See Tim Shiesser, The FBI Slams Smartphone Encryption Because There’s No Backdoor, 
TECHSPOT (Sept. 26, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.techspot.com/news/58204-the-fbi-slams-smartphone-
encryption-because-theres-no-backdoor.html. 
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anyone—whether it be for police or even users themselves.”189  Google 
followed suit, announcing that its next version of its operating system 
would require all new phones to have full-disc encryption “enabled by 
default out of the box” as a standard feature.190  While Google has not been 
able to fully implement this vision, it has not been due to a change of 
priority, but rather, it is due to performance issues.191  It continues the 
course to do so. 
The significance of these actions is that the most popular operating 
system in the world (Android) will have this encryption capability.192 
Furthermore, because Apple controls both the hardware and software of its 
products, it can implement this feature on not only its new products, but 
also on older products, which update their operating system to enable them 
to not only be encrypted, but to have lockable encryption.193 
Weakening the Court’s presumption that few phones have this 
capability is the reality that not only do these companies offer this feature—
they market based on it.  For example, Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, wrote an 
open letter to Apple users stating that Apple “respect[s] your privacy and 
protect[s] it with strong encryption, plus strict policies.”194  Apple has 
further advertised itself as actively thwarting government efforts to obtain 
data, noting on its website that “[i]n its latest Who Has Your Back? report, 
the [Electronic Frontier Foundation] awarded Apple 5 out of 5 stars for our 
commitment to standing with our customers when the government seeks 
access to their data.”195 
Not surprisingly, this has caused great concern among law 
enforcement and national security figures.196  In response to Apple’s 
announcement of the data encryption in iOS 8, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) expressed that it was “‘very concerned’ about new steps 
Silicon Valley tech giants were taking to strengthen privacy protections on 
mobile devices.”197  While FBI Director, James Comey, has acknowledged 
 189. Timberg, supra note 180. 
 190. Andrew Cunningham, Google Quietly Backs Away from Encrypting New Lollipop Devices by 
Default, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 2, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/03/google-
quietly-backs-away-from-encrypting-new-lollipop-devices-by-default/. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See Timberg, supra note 180. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Apple’s Commitment to Your Privacy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy (last visited Oct. 
11, 2015) (emphasis added). 
 195. Privacy: Government Information Requests, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/ 
government-information-requests/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2015) (emphasis added). 
 196. See Igor Bobic & Ryan J. Reilly, FBI Director James Comey ‘Very Concerned’ About New 
Apple Google Privacy Features, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2014), 
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the valid concern regarding protecting phones from being compromised, he 
has objected strongly to the aforementioned marketing techniques, which he 
characterized as advertising “something expressly to allow people to place 
themselves beyond the law[,] . . . market[ing] a closet that could never be 
opened.”198 
Similarly, Michael Rogers, head of the National Security Agency, has 
also acknowledged a legitimate concern about privacy, but openly criticized 
a “no back door” approach.199  He advocates as a compromise that 
companies create a key that can open any system to access pictures or texts, 
but divide the key into pieces, such that no one entity could access all of the 
data.200  He argues not for a “back door,” but for a “front door” with 
multiple, strong locks that will protect individuals but also allow access for 
the government when needed.201  This “split-key approach” has been the 
subject of debate in the public sphere with many identifying potential 
weaknesses, including some vulnerability to hackers and issues regarding 
key storage.202 
This debate is a real one occurring in the public sphere.  The ability of 
cell phone encryption and the complete inability of law enforcement to 
access cellphone data are well documented. “[I]n the wake of widespread 
government surveillance and increasingly serious privacy breaches by 
people with malicious intent, it looks like tech companies will continue to 
close down ways to access private data, even if that means shutting off  
access from law enforcement agencies.”203 
Yet the Court incorrectly presumes that encryption is a minor problem 
for law enforcement on only a small number of cell phones.204  Such a 
presumption was incorrect at the time it was made, and has become even 
more misplaced as technologies develop.205  Thus, the presumption under-
lying Riley’s rejection of this concern undermines the outcome of the case. 
The same is true for the Court’s suggestion that Faraday bags, 
although an incomplete solution, are a reasonable response.206  It is difficult 
to imagine how a Faraday bag will preserve data if the encryption is 
automatic and there is no way to break the code.  Furthermore, the Riley 
 198. Id. 
 199. Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, As Encryption Spreads, U.S. Grapples with Clash 
Between Privacy, Security, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015), 
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 204. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486–87 (2014). 
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opinion is rather circular on this point.  On the one hand, the Court 
advocates for obtaining access to the phone and disabling the encryption 
feature prior to its activation.207  On the other hand, the Court notes that a 
search incident to arrest is not a solution to encryption because there is 
simply not enough time to pay attention to a cell phone during the heat of 
an arrest.208 
Finally, the Court suggests that much of the information will be saved 
to the cloud and is thus available for access via a warrant.209  However, one 
merely need not have their phone set up to back up to the cloud—not an 
unreasonable action for a criminal—to circumvent that solution.  This 
brings one to the final presumption discussed in this Article, which regards 
warrants. 
3.  Presumption 3: “Just Get a Warrant” 
The Riley Court concludes its decision with the following statement: 
“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell 
phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”210  
Embedded within this “simple” statement is the presumption that obtaining 
a warrant is possible.  The Court notes that obtaining a warrant is easier 
today than it was previously due to the use of technology to speed along the 
process.211  But this quip invites the obvious questions: A warrant for what?  
A warrant served upon whom? 
If the warrant is to search the cell phone, what is the utility of the 
warrant if the concern was remote wiping?  In that scenario, there is nothing 
to search.  Similarly, no one, including the manufacturer or law 
enforcement, can access an encrypted phone.212  Indeed, as Tim Cook 
advertised to Apple users, one of the very purposes of encrypting its cell 
phones is to thwart government access.213  Therefore, a warrant for an 
encrypted phone is equally as anemic and ineffectual.  While in Great 
Britain there may be a law that requires a suspect to disclose his password, 
the Fifth Amendment precludes this from being the case in the United 
 207. Id. at 2486–87. 
 208. Id. at 2487. 
 209. Id. at 2491–92. 
 210. Id. at 2495. 
 211. See id. at 2493. 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 167–168. 
 213. See supra text accompanying note 195. 
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States.214  Thus, routine remote wiping of cell phones can create a 
measurable effect on the most legitimate methods of evidence collection.215 
Even if law enforcement could establish that information was actually 
available, the next obstacle would be identifying on whom they should 
serve the warrant.216  As discussed previously, many cell phone 
manufacturers and operating system developers have taken steps to actively 
thwart law enforcement efforts.217  They actually advertise their inability to 
comply with a law enforcement request: 
Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore 
cannot access this data.  So it’s not technically feasible for us to respond to 
government warrants for the extraction of this data from devices in their 
possession running iOS 8.218 
Although much of the data could stay on the iCloud and be accessible 
through a warrant, programming the cell phone to not back up to the iCloud 
easily prevents such access.219  The reality is that a warrant will not assist 
law enforcement if the information sought is not accessible.220 
V.  SIGNIFICANCE 
The Supreme Court has made a determination of what is a reasonable 
search incident to an arrest and concluded, in this instance, that it is 
reasonable for law enforcement to obtain warrants.221  However, the Court 
based this conclusion in some part on incorrect or flawed presumptions—
either due to its own gap between reality and experience, or the inability of 
any judicial institution to keep pace with rapidly changing technologies.222  
While the Riley holding itself may not be incorrect (it may be that the level 
of intrusion outweighs the government interest), it exemplifies an approach 
to solving complicated issues that occur at the intersection of the Fourth 
 214. See United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (indicating that the 
government cannot compel a defendant to reveal his password because it would “communicate[ a] 
factual assertion to the government and thus, is testimonial.”). 
 215. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 216. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(a) (discussing that after a judge issues a warrant, the warrant must 
identify the person or property to be searched). 
 217. See supra notes 194–195. 
 218. Jay McGregor, Apple Beefs Up iOS8 Security With Unbreakable Passcode, FORBES (Sept. 18, 
2014, 7:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaymcgregor/2014/09/18/ios8-beefs-up-security-with-
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 220. See id. 
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Amendment, privacy, and technology that is problematic.223  The Court’s 
approach is problematic because it precludes the evolution of long-term 
jurisprudence in an area of the law that critically needs guidance.224  This 
development is hindered in the same way a house built on sand can never 
be sturdy.  The Riley decision will not withstand the test of time, as its basis 
is compromised from the beginning. 
To be sure, there are some who do not regard this as problematic at 
all.225  There are valid criticisms of the notion that the government should 
have a right to access cell phone data.226  Indeed, safe manufacturers are not 
required to include in construction a way the government can always use to 
enter a safe and read the papers stored therein.227  It is a legitimate argument 
that cell phone manufacturers should not be made to do so either.  Justice 
Roberts, writing for the majority in Riley, quite rightly notes that “[p]rivacy 
comes at a cost.”228  Moreover, many of the extreme examples of abusive 
police searches, mentioned in amici and in the majority opinion, could 
indeed occur in an unrestrained, blanket search of cell phones.  However, 
the Court’s approach continues to be problematic on both a practical and 
philosophical level.229 
A.  Riley Exemplifies Practical Shortfalls 
Riley demonstrates some of the practical problems that arise from the 
judicial digital divide.230  Many cases exist in the middle ground between 
the two alternatives the Court mentions.231  The Court dwells on two 
extremes. First, it expresses concern about the extreme invasion of privacy 
a nefarious law enforcement official could engage in if he actually sought to 
violate an individual’s privacy.232  The Court also asserts that no significant 
harm will result from its ruling because in some cases an exigency will exist 
that relieves the requirement of a warrant.233 
 223. See generally Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473 (discussing Fourth Amendment and privacy concerns 
regarding digital data stored on cell phones). 
 224. See supra Part III.B. 
 225. See Leary, Missed Opportunity, supra note 4, at 351. 
 226. See Shiesser, supra note 182. 
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Such a perspective further illustrates a gap in the Court’s 
understanding of both the reality of modern policing and the role of some 
technologies in modern life and criminality.234  These cases involve neither 
extreme exigencies, which would merit a warrantless search, nor police 
abuse.  But they do involve a serious type of case in which a cell phone, 
given its ubiquity in modern life, likely contains available and important 
evidence.  For example, in sex trafficking cases, the offenders are often 
some of the most brutal: engaging in torture-like tactics to buy and sell 
women and children into lives of slavery.235  It is well documented that 
such offenders stay in contact with and keep control over their victims 
through digital devices and technologies such as GPS, texting, etc.236 
Furthermore, they are often interconnected to other members of their 
trafficking organization, and utilize cell phones to arrange purchases.237  In 
a case in which a purchaser or co-trafficker is arrested, the cell phone may 
be the only lead to the trafficker.238  While there may be reason to search 
the phone, there is not an exigency on the level of what Chief Justice 
Roberts demands in Riley.239  Under the current regime, a regime based on 
false premises, this criminal’s phone cannot be accessed in a timely manner, 
and perhaps the only avenue to a perpetrator is lost. 
B.  Riley Exemplifies and Contributes to a More Profound Problem 
This leads to the philosophical objection to this false-premise approach 
unaddressed by the Court in Riley, notwithstanding it furthered the current 
regime.  Currently, the very same commercial entities that created a climate 
in which massive amounts of data are collected, but the government cannot 
access, are profiting from it. 
The atmosphere around digital data has changed.  The Edward 
Snowden leaks revealed previously unknown government surveillance of 
Americans’ data.240  The public has also learned of several unauthorized 
 234. See supra Part III. 
 235. See Michael J. Frank & G. Zachary Terwilliger, Gang-Controlled Sex Trafficking, 3 VA. J. 
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hacks into iCloud accounts,241 corporate databases,242 and government 
databases.243  Consequently, customers and individuals are pushing back 
against companies that acted in concert with the government during its 
surveillance efforts.244  This is arguably a positive development for 
individuals seeking to control their privacy. 
The resulting regime, however, is a fiction.  The very companies that 
advertise they protect customer privacy from the government collect 
personal identifying information and aggregated data on their customers, 
often without their meaningful, voluntary consent, and sell it to private 
entities.245  For example, Apple is a defendant in a class action suit alleging 
that it collected personal identifying information on some of its customers 
on one of its commercial platforms.246  While Apple claims to protect its 
customers’ privacy from the government, its own terms of use state that it 
“reserve[s] the right to ‘make certain . . . information available to strategic 
partners.’”247 
Similarly, Google combines information about its customers across 
services and platforms, and stores the information indefinitely.248  It has 
stated that “[w]hen you use our services or view content provided by 
Google, we automatically collect and store certain information in server 
logs.”249 
The result of such a regime is that these companies play a role in 
creating this conundrum faced by the courts.  They have designed a world 
in which companies have unrestrained access to information from 
individuals—often taken without any meaningful consent by the individual. 
They collect, house, and sell the information so that the only entity without 
 241. See, e.g., James Cook, Hackers Just Released a Tool That Could Threaten Everyone’s iCloud 
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access to it is the government.250  This sort of legal fiction turns privacy on 
its head.  Not only does privacy come at a cost, as Chief Justice Roberts 
argues, but it creates an illogical framework.251  Because the citizenry is 
pushing back against a loss of privacy, it seems the only manageable target 
is law enforcement’s access to private information.  The result is a system 
in which only law enforcement is precluded from accessing information 
when the real threat to privacy is commercial entities. 
VI.  THE FUTURE 
A factor driving this perverse world in which individuals have no 
actual privacy from commercial entities, but these same entities conspire 
with individuals to preclude an underfunded police department from 
accessing personal information, is cell phone technology itself.  Our 
technological environment is rapidly changing, and thus it is difficult for 
courts to develop rules that are responsive to the realities of the 
modern-day.  But the Court’s response that law enforcement simply needs 
to work harder, based on flawed presumptions, seems an inadequate 
remedy.252  Conversely, the notion that the government has a right of access 
to vast quantities of information simply because it exists is equally as 
problematic. 
Chief Justice Roberts correctly notes that “the Founders did not fight a 
revolution” for the right to protocols.253  But the Founders also did not fight 
a revolution to prevent police from effectively investigating crime because 
their hands are tied by commercial conditioning and courts’ misapplied 
presumptions. 
Several suggestions exist to address cell phone search situations.  
While none are perfect, when analyzed by the Court, they should not be 
critiqued and ultimately rejected based on false presumptions.  For 
example, the Riley Court rejected applying the Arizona v. Gant approach to 
cell phones.254  In Gant, the Court held that police may only conduct a 
search of a vehicle incident to arrest when either the arrestee is unsecured or 
there is reason to believe the vehicle holds evidence of the crime of 
arrest.255  The Riley Court rejected Gant’s compromise approach because of 
the unique characteristics of automobiles, namely the driver’s decreased 
expectation of privacy and the heightened need for prompt law enforcement 
 250. See Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof, supra note 4, at 343–56. 
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searches.256  That presumption, however, was again incorrect.  Research of 
Americans’ expectations of privacy reveals that the majority of Americans 
feel their information is not private from the government or private 
companies.257  Similarly, just as in a car search, there is a heightened need 
for government searches of cell phones because the information is fleeting. 
The Court in Riley acknowledged the types of information available 
in a cell phone.258  Given the aforementioned discussion of encryption and 
remote wiping, this information is also fleeting.259  As Chief Justice Roberts 
reiterated for the majority in Riley, the focus of the Court’s analysis should 
be on the data within the phone, not the phone itself.260  That data, like the 
evidence in the vehicle in Gantz, is equally fleeting.261 
Therefore, the Court’s rejection of the Gant approach was again based 
on a digital divide between the Court’s perception of the nature of the 
information on a cell phone and the reality.  Such frameworks do not move 
Fourth Amendment privacy protections forward. 
Other solutions exist.  Many of these are imperfect.  They include 
some exceptions to the warrant requirement,262 but they fall short of the 
search incident to arrest exception's preference for clear rules and 
requirement of a warrant. This approach is almost analogous to the 
automobile exception, which would build upon the fleeting nature of the 
cell phone evidence.263  The problem with this approach is that the Court 
rejected a similar analogy between luggage and automobiles in Chadwick v. 
United States264and rejected the automatic, albeit slow, destruction of 
evidence produced by blood-alcohol dissipation in Missouri v. McNeely.265 
Another possible course for the Court is to follow the suggestion of 
the majority in Riley and loosen exigency restrictions.266  This approach, 
however, would lead to unpredictability and a lack of consistency.  Others 
have noted that mirroring phones would solve the problem.267  But, given 
the number of police departments without adequate funds, pursuing such a 
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plan poses other negatives.268  Finally, the Author argues elsewhere that 
limiting the commercial availability of information may protect people from 
law enforcement obtaining it.269 
The proper remedy for cell phone searches incident to arrest exceeds 
the scope of this Article.  This Article focuses on the systemic falterings of 
the Court’s currently flawed approach.  That is, the more significant 
concern is the one with broad effects. 
Many social norms change over time.  The social norm of privacy, and 
what is reasonable to expect regarding it, changes rapidly and continuously.  
Fueled by technological advances, differing experiences, and diverse views 
of digital life, changes in expectations around privacy are even more 
complex.  In the middle of this ever-transforming world, the Court finds 
itself tasked with the challenge of determining what is reasonable.270  This 
is a challenge that must be answered effectively because individuals, law 
enforcement, and lower courts need principle-based guidance. 
While no simple solution exists to this complex problem, steps can be 
taken.  Primary among them is working to address and close the judicial 
digital divide.  This can be done by not only actions of the judiciary, but 
also by all stakeholders interested in a long-term jurisprudence. 
Heeding to the repeated counsel of Justice Alito, who seems to see this 
challenge most clearly, can address this gap.271  In Jones, he recognized the 
turbulent landscape that digital advances create and called upon the 
legislature to act.272  Regarding technology, he insightfully noted: 
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular 
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in 
popular attitudes.  New technology may provide increased convenience or 
security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff 
worthwhile.273 
Then in Riley, he expanded upon this point: 
In light of these developments, it would be very unfortunate if privacy 
protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts 
using the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment.  Legislatures, 
elected by the people, are in a better position than we are to assess and 
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respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost 
certainly will take place in the future.274 
Therefore, the first step in removing the judicial digital divide is addressing 
it.  One way to address it is to relieve the Court from some of the challenge 
because it is not well suited as an institution to address these issues. 
Legislatures must act. This branch of government is most able to 
assess privacy considerations and is most equipped to understand the 
demands and constraints on local law enforcement.  As such, legislatures 
are more likely able to accurately measure a reasonable balance between the 
two. 
Justice Alito astutely notes, however, that the Fourth Amendment is 
not the best instrument for regulating privacy.275  Legislatures should also 
heed this counsel and understand that the failure to regulate private 
industries’ collection and sale of personal data has profound consequences.  
It creates a climate in which individuals feel they have no privacy and then 
turn to courts to regain control.  But those court cases are often criminal, 
and the desire for control over privacy can only target the government, not 
the entities that are the greatest threat to privacy.  This nuance leads to the 
incongruous result that allows private industries to invade privacy and 
access information readily available to them, whereas law enforcement—
who arguably has a legitimate need to do so at times—is artificially 
cordoned off from doing so. 
Not all issues, however, can be resolved legislatively.  In fact, the 
Fourth Amendment exists so that individuals are not left at the mercy of a 
government that is insensitive to privacy concerns. Here, other stakeholders 
can work to close the gap.  Litigants must present evidence and expert 
information regarding the details and capabilities of technology, both 
current and expected.  That is not to say that Fourth Amendment issues 
should be resolved based on technology.  That is not the case.  A court can 
offer principles consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence only after 
a full understanding of the technology’s uses and effects on law 
enforcement and the government.  Therefore, lower courts, faced with busy 
dockets and numerous motions to suppress, must develop the record in this 
way for appellate courts. 
Appellate courts, and ultimately, the Supreme Court must have full 
information regarding these issues as part of the cases before them, so that 
the gap between their experience and modern-day life can close.  Some of 
that responsibility falls upon appellate courts to seek out the creation of a 
full record.  These courts should invite specific amici to develop briefing on 
 274. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497–98 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 275. See id. 
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the technology and the increasing challenges it brings, as well as the actual 
abilities of law enforcement to accomplish the tasks faced with these 
challenges.276  An understanding of the technology is insufficient if it does 
not accompany an understanding of how offenders utilize it, how citizens 
perceive it, and how law enforcement can respond to it.  Courts must not 
wait for amicus parties to come forward.  Then the Court is left to sort out 
the facts based on what others framed the issue to be.  Rather, to close the 
gap, appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, must invite parties to 
brief on precise issues to gain an unbiased and balanced understanding of 
technology and its impacts.  While litigants must create the factual record 
for the appellate process, as Justice Black noted, “[m]ost of the cases before 
this Court involve matters that affect far more people than the immediate 
record parties.”277  They also affect far more people than those with views 
expressed by interest groups with the funding and time to inject their 
interest into a case. 
These measures may close the judicial digital divide and the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area may sit on more solid and long-standing footing.  
Until that time, privacy will likely continue to erode and law enforcement’s 
efforts to fulfill its function will remain artificially handicapped. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The role of technology in everyday life is increasing at every 
moment.278  This allows people to utilize technology in new ways, 
integrating it into the norms of daily living.279  Technology also allows 
criminals more access to victims and law enforcement more avenues of 
investigation.280  Consequently, when the government is seeking to execute 
its duties of crime control and investigation, it should take great caution to 
prevent law enforcement from intruding into private, protected information.  
Similarly, criminal elements should not be enabled to  take advantage of all 
the benefits this technology creates without law enforcement norms also 
being adjusted for this new reality. 
What is reasonable is a measure for the judiciary to decide when the 
legislative measure fails.  In that capacity, courts must strive to develop a 
 276. Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 29 (explaining that the United States or a state may file a request for an 
amicus curiae without the agreement of the parties or leave of court, but any other party requires consent 
by both parties or by leave of court); Brian P. Goldman, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici 
Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907, 916–17 (emphasizing the 
use of amicus curiae in the 1980s and its popularity among legal officers). 
 277. Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 346 U.S. 945, 947 
(1954). 
 278. See supra Parts I, III. 
 279. See supra Part I. 
 280. See supra Part III. 
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long-lasting jurisprudence based on principles, not technology.  To do so, 
however, they must understand the technology, its uses, and the demands 
on law enforcement to respond.  Only when the judicial digital divide is 
closed can we hope for consistent guidance for law enforcement, lower 
courts, and citizenry as a whole. 
